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Abstract
This paper explores the post-Dayton property regime in
Bosnia, as one tool for facilitating return of displaced
persons and refugees. Implementation of post-Dayton
property laws, intended to facilitate return, is explored, and
few successes are found. Reformed property laws—subject
of much attention and chief drain on resources of the
international community—remain a legal framework on
paper only, and have not delivered minority return. In
conclusion, the international community must expand its
focus beyond minority return, to the broader concept of
“durable solutions.” Acknowledging that some displaced
persons will not wish to return to their home of origin, the
international community should engage in parallel efforts
to provide solutions to those who genuinely wish to relocate.
Résumé
Cet article explore le régime des droits à la propriété en
Bosnie, un des outils développés dans le but de faciliter le
retour des personnes déplacées et des réfugiés. L’article
examine ce qui s’est réellement passé dans les faits après
l’adoption, suite à l’accord de Dayton, de lois sur la propriété
ayant pour but de faciliter le retour, et constate qu’il y a eu
très peu de succès. Les réformes apportées aux lois sur la
propriété, qui ont accaparé tant d’attention et épuisé si
considérablement les ressources de la communauté inter-
nationale, restent un cadre légal théorique seulement et
n’ont pas apporté, comme escompté, le retour des minorités.
L’article conclut que la communauté internationale doit
élargir sa vision et aller au-delà de l’objectif du simple
retour des minorités pour inclure le concept plus étendu de
« solutions durables ». La communauté internationale
devrait reconnaître la réalité que certains déplacés ne
voudront pas retourner à leurs foyers d’origine et devrait
entreprendre des démarches parallèles pour proposer des
solutions à ceux qui, volontairement et véritablement,
choisissent la réinstallation ailleurs.
The General Framework Agreement on Peace (gfap),also known as the Dayton Peace Accords, which inDecember 1995 concluded a four-year war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, guarantees refugees and displaced peo-
ple the right to return to their “homes of origin.” This guar-
antee is an essential element of the agreement that brought
to a close a war in which displacement was a central—if
not the central—goal. Chapter 1, article 1, annex 7 of the
gfap reads,
All refugees and displaced persons have the right to freely re-
turn to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to
have restored to them property of which they were deprived
in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated
for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early
return of refugees and displaced persons is an important ob-
jective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The parties confirm that they will accept the
return of such persons who have left the territory, including
those who have been accorded temporary protection by third
countries.1
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter also
referred to as Bosnia or as BiH), homes of origin has, for the
first time in the history of peace agreements, been inter-
preted to mean “the physical structure in which one lived
before the war.”2 Given the sheer magnitude of displace-
ment, this has enormous implications for implementation
of the peace agreement, as well as for development of a
Bosnian property rights regime. At the end of the war in
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December 1995, some 2.2 million people, or approximately
half the pre-war population, had been displaced from their
pre-war homes.3 A crucial task of the post-Dayton period
has been to support and facilitate their return.
To support the return of displaced persons and refugees
now is effectively to support “minority return”—that is,
return of those who would be in the ethnic minority in the
home of origin. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (unhcr) estimates that the bulk of the “ma-
jority returnees” who wished to return have done so al-
ready. Minority returns are immeasurably more difficult,
given the likely challenges to the social and material secu-
rity of the returnees, and the possible threats to their physi-
cal security as well. Such returns are much more vigorously
opposed by local authorities and others, who perceive the
return of minorities as a threat to their political power base.
Implementation of property law has been regarded as
the primary tool for the delivery of minority return. Since
the Dayton Peace Accords, the property law regime has been
substantially overhauled, with changes made to both the
pre-war property framework and the wartime legal frame-
work. The thrust since April 1998 has been implementa-
tion of those laws, in order to ensure that the displaced are
able to return to their homes of origin, thus effectively
undoing the ethnic cleansing that was so central to the
Bosnian conflict.
This paper will explore the role of property law reforms
and ensuing implementation in facilitating minority re-
turn in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will first briefly address
the phenomenon of mass displacement and the entangle-
ment of the property system in Bosnia; it will then outline
elements of the post-war property regime, and international
efforts to establish a property regime in line with the an-
nex 7 guaranteed right to return; and it will briefly explore
the record of, and obstacles to, property law implementa-
tion. Finally, having reviewed the record of implementa-
tion, this paper will query whether there may be additional
ways to help the displaced find durable solutions to their
displacement, and the potential roles of the international
community in such alternate solutions. It will argue that
minority return, while still the best of the durable solu-
tions available, is not the only solution, and that imple-
mentation of property law is not the only tool.
Property and Mass Displacement
Extensive wartime displacement unravelled elements of the
pre-war property framework, leaving the majority of
Bosnians in homes in which they had not been living be-
fore the war. Wartime authorities established new legal
structures, in part to cope with the high level of displace-
ment and the reality of thousands of displaced persons ar-
riving in their communities, and also in many areas as a
strategy of ethnic cleansing itself. In all parts of the coun-
try, municipalities developed systems to legally allocate
abandoned property (under war-time laws), either on a
temporary basis, which preserved the underlying owner-
ship or “occupancy right”4 of the pre-war occupant, or per-
manently, stripping away the underlying rights.
While some housing was allocated on the basis of need,
a substantial number of housing units were allocated
through political patronage. Housing became a highly po-
litical resource used by the powerful to bestow “gifts” upon
friends, political or military colleagues, and others of the
“right” ethnicity. Thus professors, doctors, judges, govern-
ment ministers, police, and many others received the “right,”
almost always in addition to maintaining their previous
accommodation, to occupy a second flat, perhaps larger,
or in a better neighbourhood.
This “multiple occupancy” was in some cases the result
of families dividing after children married and started new
families; in other cases, those “rewarded” with additional
living space rented out that space and acquired a tidy profit.
Local authorities were reluctant to evict these multiple oc-
cupants, particularly when they were political or other
public figures. This phenomenon has proven a serious ob-
stacle to the return of displaced persons.
In addition, throughout the country there were large
numbers of  “illegal occupants”—people in need of accom-
modation who moved into vacant property independently,
without being legally allocated space by the municipality.
In both entities of Bosnia—the largely Muslim-Croat “Fed-
eration,” and the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska—
the wartime legal provisions for property did not comply
with the gfap, or with the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(echr).5
During and since the war, all three groups have used property
rights to cement the results of ethnic cleansing, erecting legal
and administrative barriers in the way of return. The result is
a highly complex and unsatisfactory property legal system,
with elements of the old laws, war-time regulations, and the
Dayton Agreement all vying for precedence . . .6
The wartime property regimes in both areas are legiti-
mate responses to the overwhelming humanitarian bur-
den of housing huge flows of displaced persons throughout
the country. Clearly, it made sense to reallocate empty hous-
ing to those in need.7 Yet, as shown, housing was not re-
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wartime laws applied in accordance with the letter of the
law. Rather, application was highly discriminatory and
served the political ends of nationalist parties.8
Reconstruction of the Property Rights Regime
Much of the energy of the international community since
Dayton has been focused on returning displaced persons
to their homes of origin, through the establishment of a
new property regime, in compliance with annex 7 of the
gfap, and subsequently on implementing those laws. This
has been a massive undertaking, involving substantial tech-
nical resources as well as a great deal of political will on the
part of the international community.
The reform and implementation of laws giving effect to the
right of refugees and displaced persons to abandoned prop-
erty, as required by Annex 7 to the Dayton Agreement and the
State and Entity Constitutions, has been one of the largest
projects undertaken by ohr9 in the last two years. It has con-
sumed the bulk of the field resources of rrtf10 and the osce,11
it has been the subject of 14 Bonn Power12 decisions [now 24],
and constitutes the bulk of the case load of human rights in-
stitutions and domestic courts.13
The result is a legislative regime that has been substan-
tially reformed in both the Federation and Republika
Srpska. Wartime laws, and contracts signed under those
laws, were rendered void, and there is now new legislation
and instruction in both entities that creates mechanisms
for displaced persons to claim their property. The funda-
mental function of these laws was to elaborate a legal struc-
ture that would help refugees and displaced persons claim
property that was theirs before the war, but is now occu-
pied by someone else.
Political effort has been constructively directed at shaping leg-
islation crucial to the reintegration process. In post-war
Bosnia, nothing is as important as property rights . . .14
Implementation of Property Rights
Implementation of property laws in both the Federation
and Republika Srpska has progressed very slowly and gen-
erated precious few returns. Implementation of property
law has now been underway for two and one-half years in
the Federation and two years in Republika Srpska, with an
approximate total of 175,000 claims filed. Results from a
recent property-monitoring survey indicate that the per-
centage of claims resolved (in which prewar occupants were
reinstated in their homes), versus the number of claims
filed, was about 5 per cent nationwide: 6.5 per cent in the
Federation; 1.6 per cent in the Republika Srpska.15 A sec-
ond round of monitoring, completed in the spring of 2000,
revealed a similarly poor rate of implementation.
There has been reluctance to implement the laws, even
where implementation would be relatively easy, or at least
free of negative humanitarian consequences. Multiple oc-
cupancy remains an issue largely unresolved throughout
the country,16 and even reconstruction-related multiple oc-
cupancy has proven difficult to address.17 Reallocation con-
tinues in some areas, despite the legal prohibition against
the practice.
Implementation has been least successful in Croat-
controlled areas of the Federation, particularly in Canton
7 and Canton 10. In some Croat municipalities, housing
boards have still not been established (as in Drvar), and in
others the housing board exists but has no staff (as in the
Central Zone of Mostar). In Croat-controlled areas, evic-
tions are extremely rare, and forcible evictions unheard of.
At the moment, the international community seems stalled,
unsure of what leverage, if any, can be utilized to promote
implementation.
Implementation has also been abysmal in Republika
Srpska. Local authorities refuse to evict anyone who can-
not be offered alternative accommodation, and they gen-
erally discourage the return of Serb displaced persons to
the Federation. Housing boards did not operate for the first
three months in which the property laws were in place, and
staffing remains a serious issue. The heads of numerous
housing boards are themselves displaced persons, who have
an interest in preventing return of minorities.
 Implementation has been the most successful in Mus-
lim-controlled areas of the Federation, particularly in
Sarajevo, where there is, overall, a greater acceptance of
minority return. The international community has been
able to ally itself with progressive elements within the po-
litical leadership, and through establishment of the Sarajevo
Housing Commission has successfully pushed for imple-
mentation of nearly 2000 decisions. Evicted families with
no accommodation are being offered temporary accom-
modation, and the cantonal government has pledged to
reserve a portion of funds generated through privatization
of socially owned apartments for the construction of tem-
porary housing.
Obstruction of Property Law Implementation
Municipal functionaries on all sides have developed a
number of creative methods to obstruct implementation
of the property laws. As some methods have been made
more difficult through passage of amendments to the laws
or through issuance of letters or instructions, municipal
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authorities have simply found new methods, including re-
fusal to accept valid claims, if filed by mail, or by proxy
(both of which are permitted by law); requiring documents
not required by the laws; requiring current identification
documents (even though pre-war documents are sufficient
under the law); illegally charging fees, either for filing the
claims, or for obtaining supporting documentation; insult-
ing or abusing claimants; claiming lack of authority to de-
cide certain types of claims (such as business premises); or
requiring hearings, where it is clear that claimants will not
be able to attend (i.e., they are refugees or displaced per-
sons). In some areas, obstruction has been even more overt,
and municipalities have simply failed to open the housing
offices, opened them for very few hours per week, or un-
derstaffed them to the extent that claimants must wait in-
terminably to be able to file their claims.
Obstruction by the housing offices has been supported
in many cases by the police. According to recent instruc-
tions, police are required to attend all evictions and to pro-
vide security as necessary. However, throughout the country
the police have been notorious for their lack of support for
the property implementation effort, in part because nu-
merous police officers are themselves beneficiaries of tem-
porary accommodation, and some are multiple occupants.
Obstacles to Implementation of the Property Laws
Obstacles to implementation of the property laws are hu-
manitarian and practical, as well as political obstacles, and
the last are more difficult to address. These are linked, and
those with political motivations are expert at harnessing
the humanitarian concerns to suit their purposes.
Humanitarian Obstacles
Perhaps most significant of the humanitarian obstacles is
the lack of alternative accommodation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Approximately 25 per cent of the housing
stock in the rs was damaged, with a further 5 per cent com-
pletely destroyed; in the Federation, about half the hous-
ing stock was damaged, with 6 per cent destroyed.18 Despite
significant efforts of the international community to re-
construct shelter, there is still a very real housing shortage.
By necessity, implementation of the property laws and re-
instatement of original owners or occupancy-right hold-
ers will require eviction of some who have no alternative
accommodation. Under the Law on Refugees and Displaced
Persons, local authorities are obliged, to provide adequate
alternative accommodation to thosewith dp status who
have been evicted. Having dp status prevents or stalls the
eviction of many, because the authorities simply do not
have the alternative housing stock.
Authorities are also reluctant to evict those who suffered
particularly egregious losses. During the war, widows and
families of killed soldiers were given preference in alloca-
tion of vacant housing stock, and their possible eviction,
even where there is alternative accommodation, is a highly
emotive issue for everyone. Political parties have avoided
appearing to reject this constituency. There is also general
reluctance to evict anyone who comes from areas where
ethnic cleansing was most severe. Presently, in the Federa-
tion, virtually no housing boards are willing to evict fami-
lies from the Eastern Republika Srpska, where ethnic
cleansing was made famous in towns such as Zvornik,
Bijeljina, and Srebrenica, even if the temporary occupants
have property in these locations and theoretically could
return. While these issues have been used to serve political
ends, they are also genuine humanitarian obstacles in their
own right.
From a practical perspective, there is the issue of two-
way returns, or “reciprocity.” Politicians argue that if “their
people” are not able to return, they should not be obliged
to let others return to the area, but this is raised here only
as a practical consideration. Until returns are evident in all
directions, blockages will arise that necessitate evicting
people who have no alternative accommodation. While
two-way returns clearly cannot be used as a rallying cry to
delay action, they are a practical necessity in the absence of
large-scale reconstruction projects, which would permit dps
to stay, either through buffer accommodation, or reloca-
tion projects.
Finally, a practical obstacle has arisen in some parts of
the rs, where some municipalities claim they do not have
the resources to hire sufficient numbers of staff, or to train
them adequately.
Elaborating upon the discussion of “multiple occupancy”
above, it should be noted that when multiple occupants
vacate housing units, space will be freed for people to re-
turn, but this on its own will not alleviate the housing short-
age in Bosnia at present. The sheer level of damage to prewar
units implies that the need for reconstruction remains great.
Political Obstacles
The underlying political reality in Bosnia is that return di-
rectly contravenes the goals of the leadership of both the
Bosnian Croats in the Federation, and the Bosnian Serbs,19
and is seen as a threat to control over territory either ac-
quired or defended during the war.20 That return is not sup-
ported from the top, and indeed is directly opposed, is the
most significant barrier to property law implementation,
12
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manifesting itself in a variety of ways.
The major reason for the failure of return is opposition from
nationalist leaders. Authorities at all levels and in all parts of
the country have consistently obstructed return programmes
. . . Large scale minority return is opposed on all sides because
it raises the possibility of losing control over territory gained
or successfully defended during the war.21
Croat-controlled areas are led by the Croat Democratic
Union (hdz), which was until January 2000 the party in
power in Croatia. Extensive links between the Croatian and
Bosnian arms of this party have been identified, according
to the International Crisis Group (icg), is key: identifying
the hdz leadership in Zagreb, Croatia (not Mostar, Bosnia)
as the locus of control, the icg argues that “the backing
which the hdz in Bosnia receives from Zagreb makes it
more resistant to international pressure . . . ” The icg con-
tinues by saying that to “open” Croat-controlled areas of
the Federation to return will require addressing the root of
the issue, which is in Croatia.22
The integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been consist-
ently obstructed by the main Bosnian Croat Party, the Croat
Democratic Union of BiH (HDZBiH). The HDZBiH is domi-
nated by hard-liners who emphasize the consolidation of a pure
Croat-inhabited territory centred on Western Herzegovina,
with the eventual aim of seceding and joining Croatia.23
Leadership in Republika Srpska is divided between the
sloga (“Harmony”) coalition, at the entity level, led by
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, and the sds (the Serb
Democratic Party, the former party of Radovan Karadzic
“seen as hard-line opponents of Dayton”),24 which domi-
nates at the municipal level (and thus controls the housing
boards). While the sds leadership is not as obstructionist
as the hdz leadership in Croat-controlled parts of the coun-
try, there is a strong opposition to return of minorities to
the rs. The Bosnian-Croat allegiance to a notion of “Greater
Croatia” is clearly parallel to Bosnian-Serb sentiment for a
“Greater Serbia,” although direct institutional links are less
evident. Prime Minister Dodik, while sufficiently disasso-
ciated from the sds hard line to have attracted support of
the international community, has managed to deliver few
returns for fear of radicalizing the electorate. At the local
level, the sds authorities retain a tight grip on the police
forces, particularly in the Eastern rs.
Even the Bosnian Muslims, who, unlike the Serbs or
Croats, do not look to a “mother nation,” are at best am-
bivalent and also obstruct minority returns to areas they
control.25 Their interest is also in ethnic consolidation, but
within the context of Bosnia defined as a multi-ethnic coun-
try, and there is a strong desire to regain areas lost during
the war, such as the Drina valley in the Eastern rs.26 They
are interested in promoting returns from the areas they
control, but not to the area they control, so they have en-
couraged returns of Bosniak dps to areas in which they
would be in a minority, in order to legitimate and secure
territorial interests. There are recent indications that
Bosniak returns to key strategic areas of the rs, such as the
Western rs, have been at least tacitly supported by the
Bosniak administration.27
. . . the right of return will . . . continue to exacerbate the po-
litical contest of wills between the three parties, each ob-
structing return of displaced persons and refugees of other
groups who would dilute their electoral base and are perceived
as a threat to territorial sovereignty and national control.28
Can Implementation of Property Law Deliver
Minority Return?
Based on what has been observed, it seems unlikely that
anyone can expect property laws to be implemented soon,
to deliver the minority return that is at the heart of the
Dayton Peace Accords. Given the record of implementa-
tion and the magnitude of the political obstacles to return
generally, and to property law implementation more spe-
cifically, it would be too optimistic to expect dramatic posi-
tive results in the foreseeable future. With an implementation
rate of 1.6 per cent in the rs and 6.5 per cent in the Federa-
tion, coupled with the utter failure of property law imple-
mentation in Croat-controlled areas, it appears that even
the intense pressure levelled by the international commu-
nity will be unable to push this forward soon enough for
large numbers of displaced persons to make a commitment
to return to their homes of origin. With the reality of at
best stable—but more likely reduced—funding for inter-
national efforts, the ability to maintain or indeed increase
the level of pressure on authorities to comply is unlikely to
be indefinitely sustainable.
Finding Durable Solutions for the Displaced
For all of the efforts of the international community, some
836,000 people remain displaced within Bosnia, with a fur-
ther 330,000 refugees still outside the country, without du-
rable solutions.29 With five years having now passed since
the dpa was signed, there is evidence that many families
wish simply to normalize their conditions in their place of
displacement, rather than to return to their homes of ori-
gin. As the implementation process is drawn out, they re-
main in limbo, fearful of being evicted from temporary
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accommodation, but unable to return.
International policy has worked on the assumption that the
majority of displaced persons would want to return if human
rights were respected and democratic values were in place.
When people have expressed a wish not to return, this has
not been seen as a genuine choice but indicative of systematic
intimidation by nationalist politicians.30
There are indications that a substantial number of dis-
placed persons do indeed wish to return to their homes of
origin. There is also evidence, however, of a substantial
minority who may be reticent to return, preferring to inte-
grate with their present host community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, or another community within the country.
In 1997, unhcr and the crpc carried out an extensive study
of the attitude of displaced persons toward return.31 While
they found that the majority did indeed wish to return to
their homes of origin, and would like once again to live
among their pre-war neighbours, most preferred to do so
in a context where their ethnic group controlled the mu-
nicipal administration. People were much more hesitant
to return to a context where they would clearly be in the
minority. “[T]hey (also) see the prospect of living under
the control of authorities of another ethnic group as the
greatest threat to their security and livelihood.”32
Many refugees, displaced by war, do not wish to return in the
short term. Despite the desires of the international commu-
nity, Bosnia in 1996, and even more so in 1998, was not the
Bosnia of 1991. Many Serbs, Muslims, and Croats expressed
the desire to stay elsewhere than return to their homes after
the war . . . There are many reasons for this, which reflect the
changes to the region since 1991, both political and economic.33
Durable Solutions to Displacement
The impasse between the moral necessity of opposing ethnic
cleansing on the one hand, and the practical impossibility of
achieving ethnic reintegration on the other, has left the inter-
national community in a period of strategic limbo, repeating
resource intensive programmes that proved a consistent failure.34
Unhcr’s concept of “durable solutions” to displacement
includes return to home of origin; reintegration in the host
country; resettlement in a third country; and relocation
(settlement in country of origin in other than their pre-
conflict home). These options, as already mentioned, are
also guaranteed by annex 7 itself, which guarantees to dis-
placed people the right to return, as well as the right to
choose a new place to live. The international community
in Bosnia has devoted the vast majority of its resources and
energy to securing one option, while devoting insufficient
attention to other options that might help “normalize” the
lives of displaced persons. While the right to return should
clearly be considered the first and best option, it should
not be the only option. Indeed, if the international com-
munity considered supporting informed, voluntary, law-
ful relocation, in some cases, this might substantially
contribute to implementation of property law, and secure
the right of others to return.
Some returning refugees and displaced persons may decide
to settle in their country of origin in a location other than
their pre-conflict home: relocation. Not all populations dis-
placed by conflict return to their homes following the end of
hostilities. In addition to pre-conflict migration patterns, new
migration patterns result from the social and economic up-
heaval stemming from conflict, the region’s transition to a
market economy, and other phenomena such as the move of
rural populations to urban areas.35
Unhcr has identified a number of different forms of
relocation: (1) voluntary relocation, which is based on in-
formed choice, and respects the property rights of others,
(2) passive relocation, in which displacement violates the
property rights of others and becomes a permanent con-
dition, and (3) hostile relocation, in which groups of people
are deliberately placed in housing that belongs to other
groups, in order to consolidate territorial control and pre-
vent minority returns.36 It should go without saying that
the only form of relocation advocated here is the truly vol-
untary one, based on informed choice, that does not in-
fringe upon the right of others to return.37
An element of voluntary relocation of population is an inevi-
table part of post-war recovery. As the international assist-
ance operation shifts in modality from humanitarian to
development assistance, the normalization of living condi-
tions must be a priority. Voluntary relocation that occurs
through lawful transactions of property may present the best
possibility for relieving pressure on the housing situation, and
may prove complementary to existing return efforts.38
There are several ways in which voluntary relocation
could be supported, which vary in their degree of inter-
vention. These include strengthening the role of the crpc to
include facilitating the sale and exchange of property, and
providing rrtf funding for urban relocation projects that do
not violate property rights and are administered without
discrimination.39 It would be essential to ensure that trans-
actions are voluntary, and that people are provided by the
media with maximum information about their options.
14
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Strengthening the Role of the crpc
The Commission for Real Property Claims (crpc) was es-
tablished under annex 7 of the Dayton Accords to render
final and binding certificates for title to both private and
socially owned property. This legal power is independent
of administrative and court processes and is particularly
useful where title is contested. Until now, the crpc has is-
sued only certificates of ownership. However, by the very
nature of its work, the commission is also well placed to
facilitate property changes among people with proof of
ownership. Indeed, in its study on property rights, the crpc
noted that claimants frequently request that it provide this
service.40 Such a service would allow those who are not yet
ready to return—but who would like to exchange their
property with someone in the other entity—to do so; or if
they wish to sell their property, to sell it in a legal and
straightforward manner. The crpc could also help to sell
the properties for those who have settled permanently
abroad. Such an undertaking would simultaneously pro-
vide refugees with resources to help them settle in the host
country, and would free up needed housing space in Bosnia.
Because of the unique position of the crpc, it could use-
fully expand into this area.41
Providing rrtf Funding for Urban Relocation
Projects
The Return and Reconstruction Task Force does not en-
courage the funding of relocation projects, whether they
are voluntary or not. However, to fund select voluntary re-
location projects in each major urban centre in Bosnia
would accommodate displaced persons living in claimed
accommodation and slated for eviction—people who are
genuinely unable to return to their home of origin (be-
cause it is severely damaged, or for security reasons), who
may be presently employed and successfully integrating into
their new community. This would simultaneously free up
occupied housing space in those municipalities, and sup-
port return. Such accommodation could be provided to
evicted displaced persons on a rental basis.
In its study, the crpc notes that, as in any effort that
supports voluntary relocation, it would be essential that
displaced persons be provided with the most accurate in-
formation available,42 and that they not be manipulated by
their political leaders. It would also be essential that the
local press continue to be monitored in order to assess “in-
formation” produced by political parties.
Neither of these suggestions is envisaged as a substitute
for focusing on minority return through implementation
of property law, but as parallel efforts that would help some
people find solutions to their displacement, while contrib-
uting to reducing the blockage in property implementa-
tion generally.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the post-Dayton property regime
in Bosnia, as one tool that facilitates return of displaced
persons and refugees. Against a brief review of the legal
framework, this paper has discussed the implementation
record to date on post-Dayton property laws intended to
facilitate return. It has been found that few successes can
be recorded. Humanitarian and political obstacles, exem-
plified in a multitude of mundane obstructive tactics, have
resulted in few minority returns. Reformed property laws—
the subject of much attention and the primary drain on
resources of the international community—have yet to re-
turn significant numbers of displaced persons to their
homes.
The paper has concluded by arguing that the interna-
tional community must expand its focus beyond minority
return, to the broader concept of “durable solutions,” and
thus expand strategies beyond property law implementa-
tion. Acknowledging that some displaced persons will not
wish to return to their home of origin, the international
community should engage in parallel efforts to provide
solutions to those who genuinely wish to relocate. Such
efforts would not only help normalize living conditions for
a wider range of people, but would likely also assist in break-
ing the blockage in property law implementation.
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